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The dark side of coffee. 







Germany is the second largest coffee market in the world, just overshadowed by 
the United States. Coffee is the most popular beverage in Germany – in fact more 
popular than beer. In 1999 the five biggest companies in the raosted coffee market 
had a combined market share of 84.5%. The market is characterized by fierce 
competition which continues to squeeze the earnings of the German coffee 
roasters. The degree of competition was expected to increase even more as a 
result of a merger in 1997. This paper examines the pricing behavior in the German 
market for roasted coffee. The second question is whether the degree of 
competition has changed due to changes in market structure and changes in 
demand. Changes in market structure are the merger of Tchibo and Eduscho in 
1997. Changes in demand are cyclical demand fluctuations - every year before 
Easter and Christmas. Empirical results are derived using data on the aggregate 
market for roasted coffee in Germany during 1992:1 to 2000:12 and indicate that 
the market is suffering on not only a severe price competition, but on price war. 
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1. Introduction 
Germany is the second largest coffee market in the world. With a share of 9.3% of 
total green coffee consumption, it is only overshadowed by the United States with 
a share of 21.6% (DKV 2001). Within Germany, coffee is the most popular beverage, 
in fact more popular than beer. Per capita consumption of green coffee in 2000  
was 6.7 kg (corresponding to 162.4 litre of brewed coffee). In contrast, ‘only’ 127.5 
litres of beer were consumed in the same year (GFK 2000). However, coffee is a 
stagnating market with negative rates of growth and fierce price competition. The 
average growth rate of nominal sales for the period 1995 to 2000 in Germany is  
–2.5% while the average growth rate of consumption is -1.6%.  
 
In 1999 the five biggest companies in the roasted coffee market have been Jacobs 
with a market share of 27% (measured by turnover), the merged company 
Tchibo/Eduscho with 24%, Melitta with 13.5% and Aldi with 12% as well as Dallmayr 
with 8% (LIENING 2000). These companies have a combined market share of 84.5%.  
The market for roasted coffee is characterized by fierce competition which 
continues to squeeze the earnings of the German coffee roasters (METHA 1997b). 
The degree of competition was expected to increase even more as a result of the 
merger of two German coffee roasters (Tchibo and Eduscho) at the beginning of 
1997. Market observers expected substantial changes in firms’ pricing behavior: 
“[the merger] could lead to devasting competition among roasters who could be 
inclined to cut prices for the sake of mere survival” (METHA 1997a). 
 
This paper examines the pricing behavior in the German market for roasted coffee. 
Especially for 1994 and 1995 the INTERNATIONAL COFFEE ORGANIZATION (ICO) claims that 
the domestic market in Germany became more competitive. Price reductions does 
not only reflect changes in world market prices but smaller profit margins in a 
period of dampened consumption (ICO 1996). This paper examines, first, the pricing 
behavior in the German market for roasted coffee. The second question is whether 
the degree of competition has changed due to changes in market structure and 
changes in demand. Changes in market structure are the merger of Tchibo and 
Eduscho in 1997. Changes in demand are cyclical demand fluctuations - every year 
before Easter and Christmas. 
 
The analysis differs from previous work in two ways: Whereas the existing 
literature has investigated firms’ behavior for the Netherlands (BETTENDORF/ 
VERBOVEN 1997 and 2000) and for the USA
1 (GOLLOP/ROBERTS 1979), this paper is the 
first to apply a simultaneous equation framework to the aggregate German market 
                                         
1   Cross section analysis, data on the 52 largest firms in the year 1972 (GOLLOP/ROBERTS 1979).  3 
for roasted coffee. Second, it focuses on the question whether suppliers of roasted 
coffee change their pricing behavior due to exogenous shocks, in particular cyclical 
demand fluctuations before holidays and merger. The outline is as followed. The 
next section discusses the theoretical model of market demand and market supply. 
Section 3 describes the data and the empirical design. Regression results follow in 
section 4. Concluding remarks contains the last section 5. 
 
2. Theoretical model and specifications. 
Roasted coffee is supposed to be a homogenous good.
2 Following 
BETTENDORF/VERBOVEN (2000) a simultaneous model of demand and supply of roasted 
coffee is specified. Demand is specified as a linear demand curve homogenous of 
degree zero in prices and income. Consumption of roasted coffee is determined by 
the retail price of roasted coffee, the net income of households and prices of other 
beverages (complementary and substitute) (KUTTY 2000). The demand function can 
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with  t Q as consumed quantity of roasted coffee,  4 ... 0 = ∀ k ak  as parameters to be 
estimated,  t p  as price for roasted coffee,  t y  is the net income of households, 
c
t p  
denotes the retail price of a complementary good (like soda water) and 
s
t p  the 
retail price of a substitute good (like caffeine-containing soft drinks, tea or soluble 
coffee). The index t ( T t ... 1 = ) designates the time. 
Suppliers are assumed to maximize profits by choosing quantity as strategic 
variable.
3 The profit  of firm i ( n i ... 1 = ) at time t can be written as 
(2a)  () ( ) t it i it t t it w Q C Q Q p , − = π  
with  t Q  as total quantity sold,  it Q  as quantity sold by firm i,  i C  as cost function of 
firm i depending on the own quantity sold ( it Q ) and a vector of input prices  t w . 
Since 1993 the roasters have to pay a specific tax on roasted coffee.
 4, 5 The tax is 
                                         
2    Homogeneity is assumed because of aggregate data in the empirical analysis (see e.g. 
COWLING/WATERSON 1976 and CLARKE/DAVIES 1982). For the USA (GOLLOP/ROBERTS 1979) and the 
Netherlands (BETTENDORF/VERBOVEN 2000) homogeneity of roasted coffee is presumed as well. 
3    The resulting model contains the possibility of imperfect competition as well as perfect 
competition by the value of the elasticity of conjectural variation. 
4   The government invents through the levying of the coffee tax and of the value added tax. The 
excise tax is 4.30 German Marks per kilogram of roasted coffee. The value added tax on food 
counts for 7%. 
5   Till 1992 there has been a tax of 1.80 German marks per pound on green coffee and the tax of 
2.15 German marks per pound on roasted coffee. Because of the harmonization due to the  4 
symbolized by  c τ  while the value added tax is given by  vat τ . The equation (2a) can 
be modified to 
(2b)  () ( ) it c t it i it t t
vat






Solving the maximization problem subject to the individual quantity  it Q  it follows 
that 
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= η . η  symbolizes the price elasticity of demand for 
roasted coffee. θ  is the conjectural elasticity of total output with respect to the 
output of the ith firm (conjectural variation).
6 The elasticity of conjectural 
variation can take values between Zero and One. A value of Zero indicates that 
there is no response of total quantity to a change in firm i’s output change, while a 
value of One is interpreted as the monopoly case (or perfect collusion). LOPEZ 
(1984) emphasised that the degree of market power will vary monotonically with 
the level of θ . 
 
For a market model the individual supply functions have to be aggregated to a 
market supply function. For simplicity, it is assumed that the cost function has the 
GORMAN-Polar form (GORMAN 1953, BLACKORBY et al. 1978). This function stresses 
individual costs functions to be quasi-homothetic. It implies that at the optimum 
marginal costs are equal over all firms.
7 With respect to firms’ behavior the 
elasticity of conjectural variation is assumed to be identical across all firms 
(MCCORRISTON/MORGAN/RAYNER 2001). 
 





a1 = η  and used in the equation (3). The relevant supply function for firm i is 
                                                                                                                               
European Single Market the indirect taxation has been abolished. But the member states have 
intervented for the right to raise national taxes. Germany keeps the tax on roasted coffee 
(FEUERSTEIN 1996b). 
6   Because of the use of aggregated data the formula of e.g. BRESHNAHAN (1982) is not introduced. 
BRESHNAHAN modeled conjectural variation as firm i’s conjectures about other firms’ behavior. 
GOLLOP/ROBERTS (1979) suggested to evaluate the aggregate output response if only the 
existence of oligopolistic interdependence is examined. 
7   Additionally this form allows different firm to have different cost curves but the curves are all 
linear and parallel (APPELBAUM 1982).  5 
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. 
Data on prices, tax rates and consumption quantity can be easily obtained. The 
parameters θ  and a1 are derived directly following APPELBAUM (1982). The estimated 
parameter θ  gives evidence for the price setting hypothesis.  
 
Conjectures need not be constant. They may vary over time because firms form 
conjectures based on their experiences and expectations. Changes in the 
parameter  θ  can be lead back to two reasons: First, changes in market structure 
causes adjustment in pricing strategy. And second, changes in demand affect the 
pricing behavior.  
 
Concerning roasted coffee, changes in market structure happened at the beginning 
of 1997: Two German roasters (Tchibo and Eduscho) officially merged.
8 At that 
time Tchibo was the second largest roaster and Eduscho the number three. Because 
market observer found “uncertainty and fierce competition” in the German coffee 
market (METHA 1997a), the merger is excepted to influence the pricing behavior. 
 
Changes in demand of roasted coffee happens systematically over the year. The 
coffee purchases are significantly higher before Easter and Christmas compared to 
the other months. This could be seen as cyclical demand fluctuations. Anticipating 
these commonly known demand variations, firms are expected to adjust their 
pricing behavior. A high level could be interpreted as “boom” and a lower level as 
“recession”. Following the literature on collusive behavior over the business cycle 
there are two opposite views describing firms’ conduct over the cycle. On the one 
hand, collusive prices tend to move procyclically (e.g. SCHERER 1980, SUSLOW 1988, 
GREEN/PORTER 1984). If demand shrinks, firms suppose their rivals to underrun the 
collusive agreement. 
 
On the other hand, collusion is claimed to be more difficult during booms because 
the incentive to deviate is the greatest (e.g. ROTEMBERG/SALONER 1986, BRESHANAN 
1987, DOMOWITZ ET AL. 1995). ROTEMBERG/SALONER (1986) found evidence for an 
increasing degree of competition in periods of raising demand. Firms have an 
incentive to cheat on a collusive agreement because the most profitable strategy is 
to attract consumers via granting price reductions. HALTIWANGER/HARRINGTON (1991) 
                                         
8   In April 1997 the BUNDESKARTELLAMT (German Antitrust Authority) gave the permission for this 
merger.  6 
and FABRA (2001) obtained similar results based on deterministic demand shocks.
9 
KANDORI (1997) extends the analysis assuming serially correlated demand shocks and 
finds the same countercyclical movement.
10  
 
Especially for foods the seasonality and frequency of purchases have to be 
considered. And in particular for roasted coffee, the possibility of storage has to be 
taken into account. MCDONALD (2000) described falling prices for seasonal food 
products due to demand peaks: Seasonal demand increases reduce information 
costs and costs of informative advertising. The price declines are linked to market 
concentration and strengthened by a limited number of rivals (MCDONALD  2000). 
PARKER (1997) argued that demand fluctuations are fluctuations in the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution. Considering goods for which the timing of purchases is 
possible (by e.g. stock holding) demand-driven rise in sales induces relatively low 
real price increases. Firms smooth prices over time.  
 
To test for variations in the pricing behavior, the period analyzed is divided into 
subperiods (before and after structural breaks). If pricing behavior changes the 
conjectural variation can be explained by 











The dummy variable takes the value Zero before the event, and is set equal to One 
in the period after the event. Using (5) in the supply equation (4) a test whether 
firms’ behavior has significantly changed is possible. Concerning demand changes 
the hypothesis is that pricing behavior changes systematically due to anticipated 
demand fluctuations. This can be tested with the dummy variable taking the value 
One if the month covers Easter or Christmas and Zero else. Test of the impact of 
changes in market structure (e.g. the merger) can be driven out in the same way. 
The dummy variable is Zero before the merger and One after the merger. If the 
estimated parameter deviates significantly from Zero the hypothesis of no response 
can be rejected. 
 
                                         
9   In contrast, SPENCE (1977) identified the level of excess capacity and the degree of collusion to 
be negatively related. Collusive prices tending to move procyclically. But capacity constraints 
seem to be no restrictive argument for coffee because coffee can be stored easily. 
10   In a market in which demand growth rates are correlated through time, BAGWELL/STAIGER (1997) 
show that pricing amplitudes are larger when expected duration of the boom (recession) 
decreases (increases).  7 
4. Data and estimation specifications.  
The empirical analysis is based on monthly data for the German roasted coffee 
market over the period 1992:1 to 2000:12. The main data sources are the GERMAN 
FEDERAL  STATISTICAL  OFFICE and the INTERNATIONAL  COFFEE  ORGANIZATION (ICO). Since 
Germany does not grow coffee itself and all stocks are on a quite low level, 
consumption is measured as imports less re-exports (green bean equivalent). Data 




Retail prices and total expenditure per capita are taken from the GERMAN FEDERAL 
STATISTICAL OFFICE and computed as real values. FEUERSTEIN (1996a) argues that no 
good is a good substitute for roasted coffee whilst KUTTY (2000) and 
BETTENDORF/VERBOVEN (2000) see tea as close substitute. Four different beverages 
are used alternatively: black tea, soluble coffee, soft drinks containing caffeine 
(for simplicity called ‘coke’) and soda water.  
Knowledge about the production process helps to model marginal costs. The 
roasting of coffee itself is quite simple (see e.g. SUTTON 1991) including coffee 
beans, roasting and grinding as well as packaging. All input factors are used in fixed 
proportions between material input and output. Economies of scale in production 
are limited (BETTENDORF/VERBOVEN 2000). Thus, firms’ marginal costs can be written 
as a linear function of the inputs. AZZAM (1997) pointed out that this assumption is 
appropriate especially in food processing industries because the firms cannot affect 
the yield from the raw material. Using APPELBAUMs (1982) framework  marginal costs 
are inferred indirectly from evolution of input prices.
  
The main input factor are coffee beans. Measured as a fraction of the total 
production value the costs of coffee beans count for a share of 67% on average 
while other input factors take an individual cost share less than 5%. Because the 
world market prices of green coffee beans are quoted in US-cents, and the retail 
price in Germany is in German Marks the analysis has to take into account 
fluctuations in the exchange rate. The relevant marginal cost function includes the 
prices of green coffee beans of three different varieties  3 , 2 , 1 = ∀ i wi  (in US-cents) 
and the exchange rate of Dollar versus German Marks. As an additional input factor 
the model contains the costs for labor which is computed as wage per employee 
(monthly average). The price index of freight considers the costs of distribution 
                                         
11   Because of the standardized measure (green bean equivalents) it is not necessary to distinguish 
between green, roasted and soluble coffee. The production of one kilogram of roasted coffee 
needs 1.19 kilogram of green coffee, one kilogram of soluble coffee requires 2.6 kilogram of 
green coffee (DKV 1997). Such technological requirements make it necessary to use a unified 
measure.  8 
within Germany while the oversea transportation costs are included in the green 
bean prices: Quotations for the variety Other Milds 
mild w  are for prompt shipment 
to Bremen/Hamburg, for Colombian Excelso 
colom w  for prompt shipment to several 
major coffee markets including Bremen/Hamburg, and Robustas 
rob w  for prompt 
shipment to LeHavre/ Marseilles. The marginal cost function is given as (6): 






t it freight sts co labour rate exchange w w w MC + + + + + = . 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of all variables. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics in the sample. 
Variable Mean  standard 
deviation 
Consumption in mln. bags à 60 kg.  0.8314  0.1778 
Real retail price of roasted coffee, in German marks per 500g.  8.4397  0.7604 
Real household expenditure in bn. German marks.  1.9702  0.1590 
Price index of soft drinks containing caffeine (1 liter)  1.0031  0.0223 
Real world market price of Other Milds Bremen/Hamburg, in US-Dollar 
per pound.  1.2736 0.4360 
Real world market price of Colombian Excelso, in US-Dollar per pound.  1.2031  0.4357 
Real world market price of Robustas LeHavre/Marseilles, in US-Dollar 
per pound. 
0.8424 0.3352 
Real Exchange rate US-Dollar/German Marks  0.9830  0.0906 
Monthly wages per employee in 1.000 German Marks  5.1144  0.6196 
Price index of freight rate  1.6780  0.1643 
 
Using (6) the estimation model for the simultaneous model is specified as: 
(1’)  
c





















freight wage ex w w w p
 
The demand equation includes a time component. While GLANIA (1997) describes a 
consumption pattern without seasonal variations, BETTENDORF/VERBOVEN (2000) find 
Dutch coffee demand lowest in the first quarter and highest in the fourth quarter 
of a year. Testing different consumption patterns, the best fit yields a smooth 
increasing trend.  
 
Non-linearity in the parameters of the estimation equations (7) requires the GMM 
estimation procedure (see HANSEN/SINGLETON 1982). The instruments for the system 
estimation are the different input prices and the exchange rate, the price indices  
(beverage, freight), labor and the expenditure of households as well as the 
consumer price index. The estimation considers heteroscedasticity and serial  9 
correlation of the residuals. Thus, the regression standard errors and covariance 
matrices are corrected for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation up to a moving 
average of second degree. 
 
5. Estimation results. 
Three different specifications are estimated. First the so-called “basic model” 
without any dummy variables. The estimation should give information about the 
behavior of the firms in the market over the whole period. The second estimation 
specifically considers the consequences of the merger (“merger model“). The third 
model specification analyses the impact of cyclical demand fluctuations related to 
the holidays Easter and Christmas (“holiday model”). The estimation results of the 
structural models are shown in the following table 2.
12 
 
Table 2. Estimation results (t-values in brackets). 
    Basic model  Merger model  Holiday model 
Constant   0 α   3.2008 *** (4.6274)  3.5227 *** (3.8363)  5.5625 *** (4.3865) 
Retail Price   1 α   -0.1023 *** (-4.9595)  -0.0578 *** (-2.5654)  -0.1108 *** (-4.3841) 
Trend   3 α   0.0220 *** (3.0223)  0.0240 ** (2.2964)  0.0341 *** (2.9126) 
Income   2 α   -0.0092 *** (-2.8163)  -0.0085 ** (-2.4167)  -0.0110 ** (-2.3701) 
Retail Price 







Holiday Dummy   5 α   --  --  0.2094  (1.0620)  --  -- 
Constant  0 β   8.9734 *** (5.0819)  11.8804 *** (3.4139)  4.7947 * (1.7116) 
Other Milds  1 β   2.1256 ** (2.0852)  3.6240 ** (2.0747)  2.3433 ** (2.1895) 
Colombian 
Excelso  2 β   -2.0485 *** (-2.1699)  -3.5127 ** (-1.9214)  -2.5023 *** (-2.4529) 
Robustas  3 β   0.3205 ** (2.8277)  0.5876 ** (2.1321)  0.7310 *** (2.7659) 
Wage per 
employee  5 β   -0.7373 * (-1.7614) -0.7813    (-1.1093)  -1.9517 *** (-2.4339) 
Exchange Rate  4 β   -0.0008  (-0.0092)  0.0298  (0.1480)  0.0246  (0.3131) 
Price Index 
Freight  6 β   3.1719 ** (2.1616) 0.7707    (0.6441)  7.5289 *** (2.5039) 
Conjectural 
Variation   θ   -0.6988 *** (-4.5189)  -0.4850 * (-1.8832)  -0.5254 *** (-2.9231) 







Merger Dummy  γ   --  --  --  --  0.0920   1.8265 
  Iterations  28 10 14 
  Final criterion  0.0000076 < 0.00001  0.0000008 < 0.00001  0.0000077 < 0.00001 
  DW
13 demand equation  2.0550 2.3337 1.9166 
  DW supply equation  2.0672 2.2148 1.9775 
* denotes a significance level of 10%. ** a significance level of 5%,  *** a significance level of 1%. 
                                         
12   The equation (7a) and (7b) are estimated, not the reduced forms. For the second and third 
model the dummy formula (5) is included in equation (7b). 
13   DW is the DURBIN-WATSON Statistic.  10 
 
The estimated parameters of the retail price is negative and significantly different 
from Zero. The average own price elasticity is –1.0385 in the basic model, -0.5868 
in the holiday model and –1.1248 in the merger model. The average income 
elasticity is –1.7809, –1.6454 and –2.1293, respectively. The magnitude and 
especially the sign of this elasticity is surprising. Nevertheless one possible 
explanation for this finding may be that the analysis uses aggregated data on 
consumption. Consumption data does not distinguish between different qualities. 
With increasing income households may change consumption towards less quantity 
and more quality. This behavior would lead to decreasing quantity and thus, to a 
negative price elasticity. 
 
Findings for the impact of beverages - other than coffee - are not as clear as for 
own price and income. Soft drinks with caffeine (‘coke’) yields the best results. 
While in the basic model ‘coke’ has an insignificant influence on the demand for 
roasted coffee, the impact on demand is weak in the holiday model and significant 
in the merger model. The findings of the basic model confirms the observation of 
FEUERSTEIN (1996a). The negative sign in the other models indicates that soft drinks 
are complements to roasted coffee.
14  
 
The estimated signs of the coffee varieties indicate that Other Milds and Robustas 
influence the retail price positively while a price increase in the Colombian Excelso 
variety reduces the retail price. This relationship is unexpected and may suggest 
that the latter variety is less important in the German market. Another possible 
explanations are differences in quality. Other Milds and Colombian Excelso are 
important for roasted coffee. The latter is used to produce premium roasted 
coffees. If the price of Colombian Excelso increases, roasters substitutes these 
more expensive beans. Instead they use the Other Milds. Because the water losses 
during roasting are about 20% independent of the variety, the reduction in one 
variety must cause a similar increase in one other variety. Such replacements may 
lead to the negative sign for Colombian Excelso and a positive sign for Other Milds 
as well as an absolute value of nearly the same size. Costs due to changes in the 
exchange rate as well as labor and freight costs do not significantly influence the 
consumer price for roasted coffee. 
 
                                         
14   The estimated sign of the soft drinks is unexpected. All goods reveal a negative sign, that is, all 
goods are complements to roasted coffee even black tee and soluble coffee. This relationship 
must be an aspect of further research.  11 
All estimated parameters of the conjectural variation deviate significantly from 
Zero. In the basic model the coefficient is  6988 . 0 − = θ . Given the level of 
concentration in the market (CR6 = 0.9), the existence of power to control price 
among the largest firms is plausible. And especially, the negative value indicates 
that the competition is more intensive than under BERTRAND-behavior (which would 
be value of Zero). Price competition with a higher degree of competition than in 
the BERTRAND-case could be called “price war” – the dark side of coffee.
15  
 
Significance of dummy variable gives evidence whether exogenous shock has an 
effect on pricing behavior. The estimated coefficient of the holiday model-dummy 
does not differ significantly form Zero. Hence, months without a holiday have the 
same elasticity of conjectural variation as months with a holiday 
( 4850 . 0
1 0 − = θ = θ ). The annual consumption scheme does not induce structural 
adjustments in suppliers’ prices although this cycle is common knowledge. The 
‘peaceful times of the year’ - Christmas and Easter – do not stimulate variations in 
the intensity of competition. This confirms the findings of PARKER (1997). He found 
that price responses to fluctuations in demand are minor for goods for which the 
timing of purchase is important. But independent of this insignificance the 
competition is still strong. The estimated coefficient is negative. Related to the 
equation (7) the price is below the marginal costs – evidence for the price war 
hypothesis.  
 
After the merger, the number of suppliers is lower affecting the market outcome. 
The coefficient of the merger model-dummy has the opposite sign of the 
conjectural variation and deviates significantly from Zero. The difference in pricing 
behavior before and after the merger is significant. Before the merger the 
conjectural variation was  5254 . 0
0 − = θ , after the merger  4334 . 0 1 − = θ . Hence the 
impact of the merger is a decreasing degree of price fights: Away from price war 
towards BERTRAND competition. The merger has driven competition towards 
BERTRAND-behavior (price competition). But the degree of competition is still strong. 
The consumers could nevertheless benefit from relatively low prices because of the 
price war but their benefits become smaller. 
 
                                         
15    To test the stability of the results (e.g. whether the parameter is negative over the whole 
period or not) the sample period is divided into two subperiods: 1992:01 to 1996:12 and 1997:01 
to 2000:12. The results indicate that the conjectural variation does not deviate significantly 
from Zero in the first period, but in the second. In the second period, the estimated coefficient 
is negative. Combining these findings gives evidence for the interpretation that the price war 
behavior in the second period dominate the whole sample. Estimation results should be handled 
carefully due to the small number of observation. Estimates are given in the Appendix.  12 
Prices below marginal costs over several years is unexpected. An explanation may 
be the distribution chain. Food retailers often use roasted coffee as special offer 
and as product to tempt consumers to come in and buy other products as well. 
Consumer price for one pound of roasted coffee depends not only on the roasters 
production costs, it depends even more on the price policy of retailers. The ICO has 
commented that short-term price discounts has increased (ICO 1996). 
 
6. Conclusions. 
This analysis examines the pricing behavior of coffee roasters in Germany for the 
period 1992:1 to 2000:12. The estimated elasticity of conjectural variation deviates 
significantly from Zero. Even more it is negative indicating a degree of competition 
which is more intensified than under BERTRAND-behavior: Price war. This pricing 
behavior varies over time due to exogenous influences. The exogenous influences 
are the merger of two coffee roasters and retailers TCHIBO and EDUSCHO in 1997 and 
the cyclical fluctuations in consumption (before Christmas and Easter). While the 
merger has intensified the price war, the commonly known consumption scheme 
does not affect the firms’ behavior.  
 
Improvement of the analysis could be made by a few adjustments. First, the 
retailer and roaster level should be separated from each other. The gain would be 
that the effect of short-term price discounting could be analyzed straightforwardly. 
Second, the homogeneity assumption of the good ‘roasted coffee’ is a very strict 
assumption. The German market is characterized by extensive choice with many 
brands and many blends offering different qualities (ICO 1996). The market could be 
modeled in a more appropriate way concerning differences in quality. 
 
Little is known about the effects of aggregation on the results. Panel data for 
individual firms’ seems to be more appropriate. Furthermore, firm-level data could 
intend research on differentiated duopoly and the analysis of pricing strategies. 
Within heterogeneous firms, BERTRAND-behavior could be modeled explicitly with 
price as strategic variable (FEUERSTEIN 2002, MCMANUS 2001, VICKNER/DAVIES 2000). Or 
firm’s expectations about its rivals’ reactions could be analyzed empirically 
(GOLLOP/ROBERTS 1979). Moreover, the impact of the merger on rivals’ pricing 
behavior could be tested straightforwardly as well as the hypothesis of 
instantaneous adjustments to new equilibria. Further future research should also 
be done in the field of long-run and short-run effects and the persistence of 
commodity price responses (e.g. CASHIN/LIANG/MCDERMOTT 2000, GÓMEZ/CASTILLO 
2001).  
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Appendix. Stability of results. 
Estimation results (t-values in brackets): whole period and subperiods. 
  whole period  First subperiod  Second subperiod 
 
Basic model 
1992:01 to 2000:12  1992:01 to 1996:12  1997:01 to 2000:12 
Constant   0 α   3.2008 *** (4.6274)  8.1180 *** (4.3583)  -7.3783 ** (-2.1851) 
Retail Price   1 α   -0.1023 *** (-4.9595) -0.1009    (-0.9448)  -0.2032 *** (-3.2304) 
Trend   3 α   0.0220 *** (3.0223)  0.0896 *** (3.2275)  0.462 *** (2.5657) 








‘Coke’   4 α   -0.1743  (-0.3305)  -1.1831  (-0.6384)  13.0388 *** (2.9907) 
Constant  0 β   8.9734 *** (5.0819) 0.9658    (0.4756)  6.6503 ** (2.1032) 
Other Milds  1 β   2.1256 ** (2.0852)  2.1902 *** (3.4238)  2.1415 ** (2.4264) 
Colombian 
Excelso  2 β   -2.0485 *** (-2.1699) 0.2000    (0.2949) 2.1894 * (1.6549) 
Robustas  3 β   0.3205 ** (2.8277)  -1.5810 ** (-2.2664)  -2.2064 *** (-2.7447) 
Wage per 
employee  5 β   -0.7373 * (-1.7614)  -4.6196 *** (-5.4540) 0.2521    (0.2891) 
Exchange Rate  4 β   -0.0008  (-0.0092)  -0.0001  (-0.0003)  0.1080 *** (2.6061) 
Price Index 








Variation   θ   -0.6988 *** (-4.5189) -0.09287    (-0.6373) -0.5003 *** (-2.5954) 
  Iterations  21 22 14 
  Final criterion  0.0000051 < 0.00001  0.0000083 < 0.00001  0.0000056 < 0.00001 
  DW demand equation  2.1308  1.400  1.7697 
  DW supply equation  2.1427  1.0243  1.4704 
* denotes a significance level of 10%. ** a significance level of 5%,  *** a significance level of 1%. 
 